Comments

WATSON AND RAMEY: THE BALANCE OF INTERESTS
IN NON-EXIGENT FELONY ARRESTS*

Without privacy, the soul of man withers. It is like the air that
we breathe; invisible, yet sustaining so long as it is there.'

INTODUCTION
The fourth amendment 2 requires that any intrusion upon personal privacy be reasonable.3 Balancing the need of law enforcement against the extent of the invasion determines the reasonableness of an intrusion.4 Reaching this balance between individual
* The author wishes to thank Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorney Arnold T. Guminski for his enlightenment and encouragement.
1. State v. Carluccio, 116 N.J. Super. 49, 54, 280 A.2d 853, 858 (1971).
2. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizure shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S.
CoNST. amend. IV.
3. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309,316-17 (1971); Ford v. United
States, 352 F.2d 927, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
The United States Supreme Court has declared an arrest to be "a seizure
of the person" and thus within the reach of the fourth amendment.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968).
4. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967).
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rights and the necessities of criminal investigation in arrest situa-

tions presents troublesome problems.5
Recently, the United States Supreme Court rendered its opinion
in United States v. Watson,6 which dealt with arrests in public
places. The California Supreme Court subsequently decided Ramey
v. People a case concerning an arrest made in the home. The balance between state and individual interests struck in these cases
will have a dramatic effect on law enforcement and on the rights
of suspects.
While numerous commentators have addressed individual rights
in the context of search law,8 none have directly considered the privacy rights of the arrestee. The purpose of this Comment is to explore the quality of fourth amendment protection granted an arrestee.
THE Watson DEcISION
On August 17, 1972, Awad Khoury, a reliable informant, 9 told a
United States postal inspector that Watson had been stealing credit
cards from the mails. The informant and Watson were to meet
later. The inspector asked Khoury to ascertain if Watson had any
additional stolen cards. On August 23, the suspect and the informant met in a restaurant. When Watson placed some credit cards on
the table, Khoury signaled the inspector, who then arrested Watson.
A subsequent consensual search of Watson's car revealed more
stolen cards. 10 Watson was convicted for possession of the stolen
cards.
Watson appealed his conviction to the Ninth Circuit, contending
that the failure of officers to obtain a warrant had vitiated the arrest and subsequent search.'1 The court of appeals invalidated the
5. See State v. King, 191 N.W.2d 650, 654 (Iowa 1971).
6. 44 U.S.L.W. 4112 (U.S. Feb. 4, 1976).
7. Crim. No. 18795 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Feb. 25, 1976) (on file with the San
Diego Law Review).
8. See, e.g., Note, The Right of the People to be Secure: The Developing
Role of the Search Warrant,42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1119 (1967).
9. Khoury had contacted the inspector approximately five to ten times
in the past and had relayed information about Watson on prior occasions.
That information was found to be correct. See United States v. Watson,
504 F.2d 849, 851 (9th Cir. 1974).

10. Id.
11. Watson also contended that Khoury was not a sufficiently reliable

arrest.12 Because seven days had elapsed between the formation of
probable cause and the arrest, the court held that the inspector had
had sufficient time to obtain a warrant.13 The absence of an exigency 14 excusing a warrant invalidated the arrest.1 In reaching
this conclusion, the court relied heavily on Coolidge v. New Hampshire,16 suggesting warrants be obtained in all non-exigent arrest
17
situations.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
and held that the inspector had complied with 18 U.S.C. § 3061 (a),
empowering postal employees to make warrantless felony arrests.1 8
The Court noted Congress' approval of laws authorizing other fedinformant and that his consent to search was neither informed nor voluntary. Id. at 852. The court of appeals found that Khoury was a reliable
source because he had supplied accurate information in the past. See note
9 supra. As to the second point, the Ninth Circuit held that knowledge
of the right to refuse consent is not necessary to a prima facie showing of
voluntariness. However, they concluded that because of the illegality of
the arrest, the "totality of circumstances" pointed to the invalidity of the
consent. 504 F.2d at 853. Using this same test, the United States Supreme
Court found that the consent was voluntary. See United States v. Watson,
44 U.SJL.W. 4112, 4114 (U.S. Feb. 4, 1976).
12. 504 F.2d at 852.
13. Id.
14. The concept of exigent circumstances has received wide attention in
search and seizure law. The requirement of a warrant generally governs
all searches and seizures. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,222
(1960). However, the warrant requirement may be disposed of in an emergency. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760-68 (1969); United States
v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,
455-56 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). The standards
of exigency are strict indeed. See McDonald v. United States, supra at 45455. The word emergency connotes exigency.
15. 504 F.2d at 852.
16. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
17. Coolidge construed the Court's commentary in Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967), that a grave constitutional question might be occasioned
by a forceful, nighttime entry into a dwelling to arrest. Coolidge stated
that these dicta commanded, by negative implication, that arrest warrants
be obtained in non-exigent circumstances. Coolidge, however, concerned
itself with arrests in the home, not in a public place.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3061 (a) (1948) provides in pertinent part:
(a) . . . officers and employees of the Postal Service performing
duties relating to the inspection of postal matters may...
(2) make arrests without warrant for offenses against the
United States committed in their presence...
(3) make arrests without warrant for felonies cognizable under the laws of the United States if they have reasonable
grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such a felony.
Congress specifically enacted § 3061 to resolve conflicts among circuits over
the legality of warrantless arrests. Compare Alexander v. United States,
390 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1968), with United States v. Moderacki, 280 F. Supp.
633 (D. Del. 1968).
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eral agencies to arrest without prior judicial review
2
exigent circumstances. 0

9

even absent

The Court stated that at common law only probable cause was
necessary to effect an arrest. 2 1 Early cases authorized warrantless
arrests even when the police had sufficient time to obtain a war23
The majority
rant. 22 The Court found this precedent persuasive.
24
noted the judicial preference for a warrant but concluded:
[W]e decline to transform this judicial preference into a constitutional rule where the judgment of the Nation and Congress has for
so long been to authorize warrantless public arrests on probable
than to encumber the criminal process with endless
cause rather
26
litigation.
In dissent, Justice Marshall 2 6 stated the Court had never precisely
sanctioned warrantless arrests when there was an opportunity to
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3053 (1948) authorizes United States marshalls and their
deputies to "make arrests without warrant for any offense against the
United States committed in their presence, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if they have reasonable grounds to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony."
An identical grant of power is made to directors and agents of the Secret
Service (18 U.S.C. § 3056(1948)) and to the Customs Service and Bureau
of Narcotics (Act of July 18, 1956, 26 U.S.C. § 7607).
20. Until 1951, 18 U.S.C. § 3052 allowed the F.B.I. to arrest without a warrant only if there was reasonable ground to believe that the suspect would
escape before a warrant could be obtained. The Act of Jan. 10, 1951, c.
1221, § 1, 64 Stat. 1239, withdrew the condition and allowed warrantless arrests in non-emergency situations. See United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d
629, 633-36 (2d Cir. 1950).
21. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4114.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 4115-16.
24. Id. at 4116.
25. Id. In its brief, the government stated that the issues concerning
warrantless arrest in Watson could be reduced to one question: Does arrest
without a warrant under circumstances in which obtaining a warrant is
feasible violate the fourth amendment if the arrest takes place in public?
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 7, United States v. Watson, 44 U.S.L.W.
4112 (U.S. Feb. 4, 1976). During argument before the Supreme Court,
counsel for both the government and Mr. Watson were asked to cite
cases establishing a warrant requirement for arrests. Solicitor General
Andrew Fry replied that no decision had held that such a duty to obtain
prior judicial approval exists. Michael Nasitir, the defendant's attorney, responded by citing cases involving searches, asserting that the same protections afforded this latter category of intrusions should be utilized in arrest
law. Justice Stewart replied that the Court has assumed the validity of
warrantless arrests. 18 CSim. L. Rpmn. 4027, 4028 (1975).
26. Justice Marshall contended that the Court unnecessarily concerned

obtain prior judicial approval. 27 He criticized the Court's deference
to the judgment of Congress and the states, commenting:
Our function in constitutional areas is weightier than the Court
today suggests; where reasoned analysis shows a practice to be constitutionally
deficient, our obligation is to the Constitution, not to
28
Congress.
Finally, the Justice discussed the utility of warrants in search situa29
tions and recommended magisterial approval for arrests.

THE Ramey DEcIsION

In his concurring opinion in Watson, Justice Stewart emphasized
that the Court was not deciding whether or under which circumstances a police officer must obtain a warrant before entering a
home to arrest. 30 People v. Ramey 3' analyzes those questions.
Turner, a security guard, was investigating the burglary of his own
home from which several guns had been taken. On a week-day afternoon, Turner went to Ramey's apartment to ask him about the
theft. Although Ramey admitted receiving and selling the weapons, he claimed he did not know they were stolen. Turner related
this information to Officer Garcia of the Sacramento Police Department. Three hours later, Garcia and five other detectives went to
Ramey's home without a warrant. After being admitted into the
defendant's apartment, the officers arrested Ramey as he reached
behind a portable bar. A gun and narcotics were discovered behind
the bar.32 Ramey's motion to suppress the items was denied, and
33
he appealed.
itself with the propriety of warrantless arrests when probable cause occurred far enough in advance of arrest to give officers an opportunity to
obtain a warrant. Marshall viewed the materialization of probable cause
on the seventeenth to be irrelevant to the arrest. Rather, he contended,
the inspector had fresh and independent probable cause moments before
the arrest on the twenty-third. This probable cause was created by the
reliable information (Khoury's signal) concerning a felony taking place in
the presence of the officer. Because 18 U.S.C. § 1708, under which Watson
was arrested, proscribed obtaining or possessing stolen credit cards, when
Watson carried and displayed the cards he was committing a felony. When
a felony takes place in an officer's presence, he may, unquestionably, arrest
without a warrant. Thus, if the Court had concerned itself with the independence of the August 23 indicia, it could have avoided deciding the
propriety of warrantless, non-exigent felony arrests. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4119.
27. Id. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, agrees. Id. at 4117.
28. Id. at 4121.
29. Id. at 4122. Justice Marshall concluded that the intrusion occasioned
by a search is no less severe than an arrest entails. Id. at 4121.
30. Id. at 4116 (Stewart, J., concurring).
31. 47 Cal. App. 3d 866, 121 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1975).
32. Id. at 869, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
33. Id. at 868, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
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The California court of appeal 34 cited a number of cases permitting warrantless entry to arrest even in the absence of an emergency situation.35 The court found that the probable presence of
weapons in the apartment supplied sufficient exigency to excuse the
36
failure to obtain a warrant.
The California Supreme Court 3 7 reversed, relying on the statement in Coolidge v. New Hampshire that warrantless entries to arrest are per se unreasonable in the absence of exigent circum34. The court recognized that the case presented two distinct issues. The
first was whether the police acted lawfully in going to the defendant's home
to arrest him. The second concerned the propriety of the warrantless entry
into the home when officers could have obtained a warrant. Id. at 871,
121 Cal. Rptr. at 39. Unfortunately, the court neglected to address the first
of these issues.
There is at least a theoretical difference between going to a house to arrest and entering a house to arrest. As aptly demonstrated in an amicus
brief submitted by the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office, the true
issue in Ramey was the very issue ignored by the court. Ramey
dealt with the legality of going to a suspect's home when probable
cause exists. People v. Tenney, 25 Cal. App. 3d 16, 101 Cal. Rptr. 419
(1972), held that an officer could go to a house if he had probable cause.
Once an officer is outside the home, most often:
(1) the defendant exits
the house and is arrested outside; (2) the defendant consents to entry of the
officer and a peaceful arrest is made inside; or (3) the defendant remains
inside the house and refuses to respond to the officer. In the last instance,
the officer could legally enter the house by complying with California Penal
Code § 844, which allows him to break doors if the suspect does not respond
to his knock. Whether an officer ultimately arrests the defendant outside
the home, peacefully in the home, or forcibly in the home will depend on
the conduct of the suspect. See Brief for the People as Amicus Curiae at
11, People v. Ramey, Crim. No. 18795 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Feb. 25, 1976).
Section 844 was established to protect the privacy of the individual in
his home, to protect an innocent individual who may be on the premises
at the time of the arrest, and to protect both the suspect and the officer
from a violent confrontation. See Duke v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 314,
321, 461 P.2d 628, 82 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1969), which requires an officer to announce his identity and purpose before breaking to enter. These requirements may be dispensed with in an emergency situation. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 53 (1963).
35. The court cited People v. Hill, 12 Cal. 3d 731, 528 P.2d 1, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 393 (1974); People v. Terry, 2 Cal. 3d 362, 466 P.2d 961, 85 Cal. Rptr.
109 (1970).
36. The court stated that:
Appellate judges should not second-guess the police or indulge in
refined conjectures when loaded guns in the hands of felony suspects threaten public safety. The circumstances were sufficiently
exigent to excuse what might otherwise be charged as an invasion
of privacy. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 873, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 40 (1975).
37. People v. Ramey, Crim. No. 18795 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Feb. 25, 1976).

stances.3 8 The court maintained an entry to arrest is as intrusive
as an entry to search. 89 Because the latter situation requires prior
judicial approval, so should the former. 40 The majority discussed
a variety of circumstances justifying warrantless arrests but found
41
none existed in the instant case.

THE CoMMoN LAW ANTECEDENTS 42 OF
THE FoURTH

AM

MENT

At common law, a warrant was required for searches but not for
arrests. 43 This divergence was the natural by-product of a system
that valued the protection of property interests over personal
rights. 44 A search involved an invasion of property interests, while
an arrest was viewed as merely a seizure of the person. The danger
that a suspect might escape before a warrant issued was a further
rationale for the discrepancy.4 5 Common law permitted non-exigent 48 felony arrests solely on the basis of probable cause. 47 In con38. Id. at 10. The court cited to a number of jurisdictions that had
adopted the language in Coolidge.
39. Id. at 18.
40. Id.
41. The court defined an exigent circumstance, which would excuse any
obligation to obtain a warrant, as "an emergency situation requiring swift
action to prevent danger to life or to property, or to forestall the ... escape
of a suspect or destruction of evidence." Id. at 19. This definition is identical to that utilized in search law. See note 14 supra.
The court stated that the existence of an exigency varies according to the
facts in the case. Crim. No. 18795 at 19. As applied to the facts in Ramey, the
court found that the defendant was being arrested for an essentially nonviolent offense-receiving stolen property. Additionally, the officer had little reason to believe Ramey still possessed the weapons allegedly taken
from Turner's home, because Ramey claimed that he sold them. See text accompanying note 32 supra. Finally, the court found the three-hour delay
provided the officer with sufficient time in which to obtain a warrant.
Crim. No. 18795 at 20.
42. The significance of the fourth amendment is found in the historical
background in which it was created. See District of Columbia v. Little,
178 F.2d 13, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (Holtzoff, J., dissenting).
43. See J. LANDYNsKi, SsEAcH AND SEIZURE ANM THE SUPREME COURT 45
(1966).
44. Id.; N. LAssoT, THE HISTORY AND DI ELOmPFNT OF THE VFoUwrH
AMENDMVENT TO THE UNITED STTES CoNsTruro 13-50 (1937) [hereinafter
cited as LAssEN].
45. J. LANDYNSxI, supra note 43, at 45.
46. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 292; 2 M. HAWKINS, PLEAS
or THE CRowN chs. 12, 13 (8th ed. 1824); 4 J. STEPHENS, COMMENTARIES
ON TH LAW OF ENGLAND ch. 16, § 3, at 395 (1845).
47. See E. COKE, FoURTH INSTrTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 177 (1797);
2 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CRowN 75-84 (first Amer. ed.
1847); 1 J. STEPHENS, A HISTORY OF CIMxNA.L LAW OF ENGLAND 193 (1883).
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trast, neither private citizens 48 nor judicial officers4 9 were permitted to break into a home to seize items5 ' or to make a warrantless
arrest.51
Arrest warrants were used infrequently at common law. 52 When
employed, however, they were greeted with a certain measure of
suspicion and hostility. The state compelled citizens to assist in the
detection and apprehension of offenders 53 and private use of warrants led to abuses. Vengeful individuals could swear out warrants
and use them to enlist the assistance of others in their private ven54
dettas.
During the Tudor and Stuart periods, 5 the Crown employed general warrants5 6 to investigate sedition matters and to force indis-

criminate entry into homes in order to collect revenues. 57 These
warrants permitted officials to seize all desired evidence and people,
48. As early as the fifteenth century, a property owner could go onto
the land of another whom he suspected of stealing his goods, but he could
not enter the suspect's home without a warrant. See Y.B. Pasch. 9 Edw.
4,10 (1470).
49. Constables "broke house" at their own peril See 2 M. HALE, supra
note 47, at 98-104.
50. See Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (1765).
51. For a complete discussion of entry to arrest at common law, see Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d 456, 460-62 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
52. See text accompanying notes 45 and 47 supra.
53. See J. KAPLAN, CRnVMINAL JUSTICE:

INTRODUCTORY CASES AND MATE-

nmxLs 90 (1973) [hereinafter cited as KAPLAN]. A professional police
force was not established until the nineteenth century because of fear that
such a force would be as oppressive as police on the continent had been.
Id. During the interim, private citizens served as policemen.
54. See 1 J. CInTr,

HISTORY OF THE CRInlAL LAw 53 (1816).

Another

facet of citizen participation was to raise the "hue and cry" and pursue a
suspected felon. See Wilgus, Arrests Without Warrants, 22 ihca. L. REV.
541, 545 (1924). Unfortunately, the individual who raised the hue and cry
on one ultimately acquitted was severely punished. See 2 F. PoLLocK &
F.

MAITLAND, THE

-ISTORY

OF ENGLISH LAW

583 (1889).

Arrest warrants

were used by "raisers" to guard against personal liability. See Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth Amendment, in THE SuPRamm
COURT Ain THE CONSITTrON 49-50 (1970).
55. The Tudor and Stuart periods cover the years between 1471 and 1714.
56. General warrants allowed officers to seize without specificity all persons and all items desired by the Crown.
57. See LASsoN 20. Sedition. prosecution skyrocketed during this period
because of intensified political activism and criticism directed at the Crown.
See R. LOcKYER, TUDOR AND STUART BrTAns 3-4 (1964). Revenues necessary to support the government and American exploration came from increased taxes. See LAssoN 13-50.

and to take money for the payment of taxes. 58 When taxation was
imposed on the American Colonies, general warrants accompanied
it. 59 The fourth amendment was adopted precisely in reaction to
0
the general warrant.6
The framers drafted the amendment to neutralize the arbitrary power of the government to search and arrest
at will."1 In the hope of restoring common law practices, the
amendment required a warrant to be both sufficiently exact and
founded on just cause. 62 The fourth amendment "does not prohibit
arrest without a warrant, but, simply, the unauthorized issuance of
a warrant without oath or affirmation." 6
THE STATUS OF FELONY 64 AiREST LAW
Statutory law provides for warrantless arrests by federal officers. 5 When federal statutes do not cover a particular situation,
the law of the state in which the seizure takes place controls.00
State arrest law is also primarily statutory. A majority of states
has adopted the mandate of Carroll v. United States: 7 "[A] police officer may arrest without a warrant one believed by the officer
upon probable cause to be guilty of a felony. '68 These statutes ac58. As a result of court decisions and popular pressure, the English
people were eventually able to rid themselves of the general warrant. See
LAssox 53.
59. Id.

60. Both James Otis and Patrick Henry addressed themselves to the injustices of general warrants. See J. McMAsTER & F. STONE, PENNSYLVANIA
AND THE FEDERAL CoNsrTTuTioN 58 (1888).
It was solely to shield against
the use of general warrants that Patrick Henry stressed that the fourth
amendment be passed. See J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTrrUTION 588 (1836).
61. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Frank v. Maryland, 359
U.S. 360, 363 (1958).
62. See T. TAYLOR, Two STUnIEs iN CoNs-nwUIoNAL INTEmPRETATION 41
(1969).
63. 6A C.J.S. Arrest § 10 (1975).
64. In contrast to felony arrests, an officer must have a valid warrant
or have seen the offense committed in order to arrest for a misdemeanor.
18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1964). The rationale for this difference in treatment
was stated in People v. Williams, 17 Cal. App. 3d 554, 562, 95 Cal. Rptr.
233 (1971):
The statute [dealing with misdemeanor arrests] impliedly recognizes the obvious fact that most felonies will not occur in the presence of an officer and that the protection of society against serious
crime is better served by granting a broader base for felony arrests.
65. Federal officers are authorized to arrest without a warrant. See notes
18-20 supra. State or federal officers must have probable cause to arrest.
Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West 1957); ALI CODE OF PRE-AMIGNMENT
PIocEDUREs § 120 (1975).
66. See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1947).
67. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
68. Id. at 156-57. The following state statutes adhere to the Carroll rule:
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count in part for the under-utilization of arrest warrants.6 9 Both
federal and state law authorize warrantless entries into the home
to effect an arrest 7 0 although a preference for prior judicial apALA. CODE tit. 15, § 154 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.030 (1973); ARz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1403 (Supp. 1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-403 (1964);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 6-49 (1972);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1906(b) (1975); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-581 (a) (1)
(A) (1973); FL. STAT. ANN. § 901.15 (1973); HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 37
§ 708-5 (1968); IDAHO CODE § 19-603 (1948); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38
§ 107-2(c) (1973); IowA CODE § 755.4 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 13623 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.005(1) (1969); LA. CODE Cpvm.
PRO. AN. art. 213 (West 1967); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 594B (1971);
McHL STAT. ANN. § 764.15 (1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.34 (1947);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7 (1973); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-404.02 (Cum.
Supp. 1969); NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.124 (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. AN. § 594.10
(1974); N.J. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 40: 174-166, 40:174-196 (1967); N.Y. ClM.
PRO. LAW § 140.10 (McKinney 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-104(b) (2)
(1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-15 (1974); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.04
(1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 196 (1969); ORE. REV. STAT. § 133.310
(1971-1972); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-7-4 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 17-251 (1962); S.D. Comp. LAws ANN. § 23-22-7 (1969); TEN. CODE
ANN. § 40-803 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-3 (Supp. 1973); VT.
CODE OF Canvr. PRO. Rule 3(a) (1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-100 (Cum.
Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. § 986.07 (1971); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-155 (1959).
For this rule applied in Washington, see State v. Kohler, 70 WASH. 2d
599, 424 P.2d 656 (1967); in Virginia, see Hill v. Smith, 107 Va. 848, 59
S.E. 475 (1907); in West Virginia, State v. Hammond, 96 W. Va. 96, 122
S.E. 363; State v. Brown, 101 W. Va. 160, 132 S.E. 366 (1926).
Colorado requires a warrant when practical. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163-102 (1974). Georgia allows warrants to be dispensed with in emergencies.
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-207 (1972); Thomas v. State, 91 Ga. 204, 18 S.E.
305 (1892). IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1024 (1956) allows warrantless arrestees
to be held only until a warrant can be obtained. Warrantless arrests generally conform to the Carroll standard. See Hanger v. State, 199 Ind. 727,
160 N.E. 444 (1928). In Maine, warrantless arrestees must receive a speedy
post-arrest hearing. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 704 (1965). Massachusetts statutory law does not mention a warrant. MAss. GEN. LAWS
ch. 41, § 98 (1973), but case law holds that warrantless arrests are valid.
See Commonwealth v. Lawton, 348 Mass. 129, 202 N.E.2d 824 (1964). In
Missouri, no statute allows warrantless seizures, but decisions of the supreme court have authorized such arrests if the police obtain a warrant after
the arrest. See State v. Padgett, 316 Mo. 179, 289 S.W. 954 (1926); State
v. Hall, 312 Mo. 425, 279 S.W. 102 (1926). MONT. Rv. CODE ANN. § 95608 (d) (1969) authorizes warrantless arrests in exigent circumstances. New
Mexico courts have validated warrantless seizures. See Territory v. McGinnis, 10 N.M. 269, 61 P. 208 (1900); State v. Selgado, 76 N.M. 187, 413 P.2d
469 (1966).
Pennsylvania embodies the common law practices. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 12.7 (Supp. 1974).
Texas prefers a warrant. See
Honeycutt v. State, 499 S.W.2d 662 (Ct. of Crim. App. 1964).
69. See J. LAI-DYNsKI, supra note 43, at 45.
70. See, e.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925); ALA.

proval has often been voiced.7 ' Of course, a warrant is not required
72
when exigent circumstances are present.
A significant problem arises in a non-emergency situation
wherein the officer has an adequate opportunity to obtain a warrant. Watson's approval of warrantless, non-exigent arrests in public places resolves only half the problem.7 3 The other half, invaCODE tit. 15, § 155 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.100 (1962); AIz.
REV. STAT. ANx. § 13-1411 (1956); CAL. PENAL CODE § 844 (West 1970);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.19(1) (1944); HAwAII REv. STAT. tit. 37, § 70811 (1968); IDUno CODE § 19-611 (1947); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1009 (1956);
IOWA CODE § 755.9 (1950); Ky. REV. STAT. Amr. § 70.078 (1969); LA. CODE
PRO. ANN. art. 224 (1967); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.880 (1954);
or Cms.
MnN. STAT. ANN. § 629.34 (1947); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2471 (1942); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 544.200 (1953); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-602(c) (1969);
Ns. REV. STAT. § 29-411 (1964); NEv. REV. SmT. § 171.142 (1969); N.Y.
CODE CnMv. Psoc. § 175 (1958); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-44 (1965); Omo REv.
CODE ANN. § 2935.12 (1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 194 (1969); OE.
REV. STAT. § 133.320 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 53-198 (1962); S.D. COMp.
LAWS ANN. § 23-22-18 (1967); TsNw. COD ANN. § 40-807 (1955); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-13-12 (1953); WASH. REV. Cons ANN. § 10.31.040 (1961);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-165 (1957).
71. There is a continuing preference for the use of an arrest warrant. See
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 314 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting, in which
Justice Douglas is joined by Justices Warren, Brennan, and Fortas in urging
that an arrest warrant be obtained whenever possible. (Justice Brennan
took part in Justice Marshall's dissent in United States v. Watson.)
72. United States v. Watson, 44 U.S.L.W. 4112, 4122 (U.S. Feb. 4, 1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
73. See Justice Powell's concurrence in Watson for the proposition that
no decision handed down by the Court has directly concerned a warrantless
non-exigent arrest in a public place. Id. at 4117 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Powell states that all the cases cited by the majority to support its principle
themselves involved emergency situations. Therefore, they could not be
relied upon to establish the propriety of warrantless arrests in all circumstances.
Prior to Watson, there was a split of opinion as to the validity of nonexigent warrantless arrests. For decisions denying that a warrant was required in non-emergency circumstances, by dicta or otherwise, see Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1970); Chimel v. California, 895 U.S. 752,
777 (1968); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); United States
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1948); United States v. Gonzales, 483 F.2d 223,
225 n.2 (2d Cir. 1973); Daley v. United States, 261 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1958);
State v. Ramirez, 284 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. App. 1973); J. WMARTON, CRIvINAL PROCEDURE § 61, at 162 (12th ed. 1974). The ALI Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedures,as well, does not require a warrant. The rationale
offered is that:
[S]uch a requirement would be entirely novel ....
[T]he need for it is not urgent and the subsequent litigation such
an inquiry would authorize would be indeterminate and difficult.
ALT MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURES § 120.1, Comment at 303
(1975).
In contrast, in Wheeler v. Goodman, 330 F. Supp. 1356, 1370 (W.D.N.C.
1971), the court stated that a warrant was necessary unless an emergency
existed. The court justified its view by reference to Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89 (1964):
An arrest without a warrant bypasses the safeguards provided by
[P]robable cause substitutes
an objective predetermination....
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74
sions of the home, has not been resolved thus far for all states.
In fact, many courts have uncritically assumed the validity of war75
rantless invasions.

However, several years ago, one court began to question this assumption, indicating disfavor with invasions of the home absent
prior magisterial approval.7 6 Rejecting the presumption of propriety for warrantless entries and discussing the comparative significance of the competing interests involved, the District of Columbia
Circuit 77 concluded that "the fourth amendment is to be construed
in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.'7
Subsequently, in Accarino v. United States,79 the same court found the fundamental
right to privacy in the home is outweighed only by an emergency
situation or by an essential 0 opposing interest.8 ' By 1970, the cir... the far less reliable procedure of an after the event justification for the arrest ... which is too likely to be substantially influenced by the familiar shortcoming of hindsight. 330 F. Supp. at 96.
74. The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on the legality of
a warrantless entry in the absence of exigent circumstances. See Gerstein
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 n.13 (1975); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963);
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499-500 (1957).
75. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 511-12 n.1 (Burger
& White, J.J., concurring and dissenting). See also United States v. Watson,
44 U.S.L.W. 4112, 4114 (U.S. Feb. 4, 1976); People v. Ramey, Crim. No.
18795, at 18 n.7 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Feb. 25, 1976).
States contribute to the confusion by not clarifying under which circumstances a home may be entered. See note 70 supra.
76. See District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
77. The court discussed the pressing need of the city to inspect dwellings
for health code violations, id. at 20, but concluded that the right to privacy
overcame that interest. Id. at 17, 20. However, an emergency could alter
the situation. Id. at 20.
Even the dissenting opinion made use of this method of weighing the
competing interests. Judge Hortzoff stated that the sanctity of the home
was not absolute but rather was subject to some restrictions. One such
situation, he stated, was the right of the state to conduct warrantless health
inspections in order to further public interests. Id. at 25.
78. Id. at 21.
79. 179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
80. This language interestingly forecasts an important aspect of privacy
law developed by the Court years after Accarino had been decided. In
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court reiterated
the fundamentality of the right to privacy. A state statute, motivated by
an interest in the general welfare, must represent a compelling need in
order to infringe on the right to privacy and nevertheless to be sustained
by the judiciary. For instances in which a lesser personal interest clashes
with a state regulation, the state law need only be rationally related to
a legitimate state interest in order to be valid. Id. at 497-98.
81. 179 F.2d at 458.

cuit court had assembled an array of factors relevant to the balancing process.8 2 The determination of where and under which circumstances the right to privacy must yield to the right of law
enforcement is dependent on these factors.8 3 The District of Columbia Circuit's enlightened perception of the need for balancing the interests involved has been adopted by a number of jurisdictions.8 4
THE BALANCE OF INTERESTS

The InterestsPresentin Arrest Situations
Two aspects of the individual's right to privacy in arrest situations are his right to mobility 5 and his ability to conduct himself
in private.88 Like all other constitutional rights, the right to privacy is subject to reasonable restrictions.8 7 In Katz v. United
States,"8 the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the permissible re82. Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc).
Among these circumstances are:
(1) whether a serious offense, particularly a crime of violence, is
involved;
(2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed;
(3) whether there is a clear showing of probable cause;
(4) whether strong reason exists to believe the suspect will escape

if not swiftly apprehended;
(5) whether the entry is forcible or peaceful; and
(6) whether the entry is at night. Id. at 390-91.
83. Id.
84. Ramey documents another jurisdiction that has viewed the balance
in a light more favorable to individual rights. Other jurisdictions have concurred. See United States v. Shye, 492 F.2d 886, 891 (6th Cir. 1974); United

States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 1974); Salvador v. United
States, 505 F.2d 1348, 1351-52 (8th Cir. 1974); Vance v. North Carolina, 432
F.2d 984, 990-91 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Rodriguez, 375 F. Supp.
589, 593 (S.D. Tex.), affd, 497 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1974); Huotari v.
Vanderport, 380 F. Supp. 645, 649-51 (D. Minn. 1974); Commonwealth v.
Forde, - Mass. -, 329 N.E.2d 717 (1975); Nilson v. State, 272 Md. 179,
321 A.2d 301 (1974); People v. Moreno, 176 Colo. 488, 491 P.2d 575 (1971).
85. See A. GREENW.ALT, THE RIGHT Or PRIVACY AND TH RIGHTS OF AMERIcANs 299, 373 n.3 (1971). This aspect of the right was recognized as early
as 1890, when it was characterized as the right to be "let alone." Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
Similarly, derivations of this right have been noted by the Supreme Court
in automobile search cases. Therein, the Court pays deference to the "free
right of passage without interference." United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
86. See A. WEST=, PRiVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). The author refers
to this as the right of selective disclosure. It gives the individual the ability
to choose how, if at all, information about him will be gathered through
observation.
87. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960); District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (Holtzoff, J., dissenting).
88. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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strictions on this right. Prior to that decision, physical intrusions
by the government into "constitutionally protected areas" triggered
fourth amendment protection.8 9 Katz established a "reasonable expectation" test presumably to replace this location-oriented approach to the right of privacy.90 The reasonableness of the expectation depends on one's subjective view as well as on whether society would agree that the individual deserves protection.9 1 Justice
Harlan, however, wisely foresaw that the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy cannot be divorced from the context in which
the right is asserted.9 2 Whether the fourth amendment protects the

89. See Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment: A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, or A Man's Home is His Fort, 23 CLEV. L. REv. 63 (1972).
In essence, the rights of suspects were definable in terms of the place they
happened to be when the intrusion occurred. Under the pre-Katz classification scheme, fourth amendment protection was afforded to the following
areas: the home, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); business
offices, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920);
stores, Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); hotel rooms, United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); autos, Henry v. United States, 361
U.S. 98 (1959); and taxis, Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
However, open fields, Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 159 (1924), and
jails, Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143-45 (1962) are not protected.
90. 389 U.S. at 352.
91. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Unfortunately, Katz created more
confusion than clarity. Cases in the various jurisdictions following the
Katz decision documented conflicts among the courts as to which type of
conduct constitutes an invasion, thereby invoking the protection of the
fourth amendment. See Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment: A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, or A Man's Home is His Fort, 23 CLEV. L. REv.
63 (1972).
92. Subsequent to Katz, a reasonable expectation of privacy has been
found to exist in the home, United States v. Rubin, 343 F. Supp. 625
(E.D. Pa. 1972); a dorm room, Piazolla v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284 (5th
Cir. 1971); an office, Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); a restroom, Brown v. State, 3 Md. App. 90, 238 A.2d 147 (1968) (a physical
intrusion) and People v. Metcalf, 22 Cal. App. 3d 20, 98 Cal. Rptr. 925 (1971)
(surreptitious surveillance).
There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in jails, United States
v. Hitchcock, 467 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973);
open fields, United States v. Pruitt, 464 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1972); and
yards, People v. Bradley, 1 Cal. 3d 80, 460 P.2d 129, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457
(1969).
California adheres to the location-oriented approach to privacy rights. See
People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 512 P.2d 1208, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1973).

individual's privacy in a particular instance depends largely on
where he is at the time.9
The other side of the balance represents the interests of the state.
Undeniably, society has a valid objective in apprehending criminals.4 This interest, however, is tempered to the extent its accomplishment infringes upon significant personal rights.95 Even absent
an opposing fundamental right, law enforcement procedures must
possess a demonstrable connection to effective criminal investigations. Nevertheless, an objective assessment of the nexus between
a procedure and a proper state goal is extremely difficult.9 0 In the
case of arrest law, it is questionable whether anyone can document
that the absence of a warrant requirement in non-exigent circumstances will assist law enforcement efforts sufficiently to overcome
concomitant deprivations of personal rights27 Courts often must
be guided merely by what Justice Cardozo called "a robust common
sense."9 8 In the alternative, they may simply defer to the judgment
of the legislature. 99 Ultimately, any court engaging in the balancing process must weigh the fundamentality of the individual righthere, the right to privacy-against the necessity for state action.
The Balance of Interests in Non-Exigent Public Arrests: A Critical
Comment
The holding in Watson represents a certain anomoly. The fourth
amendment demands a warrant for all non-exigent searches. 100
93. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
94. This is justified by the state's legitimate interest in its own self-protection. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 887 (1975)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
95. See notes 80, 87 supra.
96. See Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MIcH. L. REv.
219,226 (1965).

97. The majority opinion in Watson mentioned the encumbrance on law
enforcement that a warrant requirement for non-exigent arrests would occasion. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4114. However, the Court did not elaborate. Surface
examination of the consequences of a warrant requirement would reveal
minimal quantitative encumbrances on law enforcement because most arrests do not take place under non-exigent circumstances. See PaESiwET's
CoIVmzssioN ON LAW ENFORCEMTENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JuSTIcE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 8 (1972). More penetrating

analysis, on the contrary, indicates that such a requirement in public arrests
would cut short the criminal investigation process by which innocent suspects may be cleared and sufficient evidence against the suspect amassed.
See text accompanying notes 108 and 109 infra. Thus, qualitatively, law
enforcement investigations would suffer.
98. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937).
99. Watson stands as an obvious example of this deference. See text accompanying notes 23 and 25 supra.
100. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 31421 (1972); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
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Even probable cause will not excuse the failure to obtain a warrant.10: Justice Jackson maintained that permitting warrantless
searches would:
[R] educe the amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes
secured only in the discretion of police officers. When the right
of privacy must necessarily 02yield is to be determined by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman.1

Why the standard for searches should be different from that applicable to arrests has long puzzled some courts.103 However, this distinction is defensible for several reasons.
First, the possibility always exists that the suspect will escape.
An automobile possesses a similar potential for mobility. 10

4

Ac-

cordingly, the courts have created an exception to the general
search warrant requirement for the auto, 0 5 solely because of its inherent ability to evade seizure. 10 6 It defies logic to justify an exception to the warrant requirement for autos because they are potentially mobile and to require a warrant for individuals who have the
same escape capabilities.
Second, undue limitations would be placed on the investigatory

function of law enforcement if judicial approval to arrest is required at the moment probable cause arises. Police often have a
legitimate reason to refrain from arresting at the exact time prob101. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450 (1971); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-58 (1967).
102. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
103. See Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Watson. 44 U.S.L.W. at
4117 (Powell, J., concurring).
104. A person has the same potential for escape that an auto has. See
United States v. Hale, 348 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1965). Justice Clark pointed
this out in his dissent in People v. Ramey. Ramey had certainly been
alerted by Turner's visit, and he had the opportunity to flee. Nevertheless,
the court did not consider this factor. Crim. No. 18795 at 8-9 (Cal. Sup.
Ct., Feb. 25, 1976) (Clark, J., dissenting).
105. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
106. This exception has been utilized even when the auto was incapable
of moving. In Chambers, the auto was taken to police headquarters and
searched there under guard. The Court rationalized this later search as no
more intrusive than would have been one conducted at the scene. 399
U.S. at 51 (no more intrusive, perhaps, but certainly much less exigent).
In Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), the Court approved a warrantless extraction of paint scrapings and tire imprints while the auto was in
a commercial lot and the defendant was in custody.
By implication, the Court in these two decisions focuses primarily on the

able cause materializes. 10 7 Information gathered by police between
the time probable cause arises and the ultimate arrest possibly can
exculpate the innocent suspect' 0 8 and ensure that sufficient evidence is gathered to allow conviction of the guilty suspect and accomplices. 0 9 Requiring that an arrest warrant be obtained at the
moment probable cause arises prematurely terminates a complete
investigation.
Third, even if a warrant is generally required, an arrestee would
not be assured prior judicial approval in all situations. An officer
might fail to recognize when probable cause arises. Thereafter, the
occurrence of an "exigency,""10 such as observing the suspect committing a felony, 1 ' will excuse the former's duty to obtain a warrant." 2 As the Supreme Court held in Cardwell v. Lewis,113 "[t]he
exigency may arise any time and the fact that police might have
obtained a warrant earlier does not negate the possibility of a curu 4 The primary
rent situation necessitating prompt police action.""
thrust of an arrest warrant requirement is to assure magisterial approval of arrests in situations in which the existence of probable
cause is not so obvious. 1 5 When an officer fails to recognize unobvious indicia of guilt, the suspect can be precluded entirely from obtaining the objective evaluation a warrant requirement is designed
to assure.
inherent nature of the auto as being capable of mobility rather than ascertaining, in each situation, if the car could be moved.
107. See Godfrey v. United States, 358 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
108. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 23, United States v. Watson,

44 U.S.L.W. 4112 (U.S. Feb. 4, 1976).

109. See United States v. Murray, 492 F.2d 178, 189 (9th Cir. 1973); State

v. Birdwell, 6 Wash. App. 284, 492 P.2d 249 (1972).

Watson is an excellent example of officers delaying the arrest to catch
the defendant with more credit cards, compounding violations of 18 U.S.C.

§ 3061. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4113.
Extensive delays are allowed in narcotics cases in order to protect the

undercover agent from premature identification.

See Abramson v. United

States, 326 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1964); Dailey v. United States, 261 F.2d 870
(5th Cir. 1958).

110. The term exigency also includes situations in which the defendant

might attempt to flee, destroy evidence or contraband, or in which he pre-

sents a danger to himself, the officer, or others. See notes 14 and 41 supra.
111. This was the fact situation in Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S.
699 (1948).
112. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Trupiano v. United States,
114 U.S. 699 (1948).
113. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
114. Id. at 595-96.
115. Logically, a suspect against whom sufficient indicia of guilt have
been amassed is less in need of evaluation of the sufficiency of the cause
upon which he is arrested than is the individual who is confronted by criminal evidence of a doubtful nature.
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Finally, the present system provides more safeguards for an individual arrested without prior judicial approval than for one arrested pursuant to a warrant. Warrantless arrests require a greater
10
quantum of probable cause than do those effected with a warrant. 6
Additionally, if a defendant arrested without a warrant challenges
the validity of his seizure, the state carries the burden of proof that
the invasion did not violate his rights.11 7 In cases where probable
118
In
cause is doubtful, the police officer must obtain a warrant.
contrast, when probable cause is obvious, there is less need for magisterial objectivity. Arrestees seized without a warrant have the
right to a speedy post-arrest hearing 9 to determine the sufficiency
20
Ideally, this hearing
of the cause upon which they were arrested.
requirement will act as a further deterrent to lawless police behavior.12 1 Moreover alternatives to detention are available to warrantless arrestees that are not permitted those arrested on a war12 2
rant.
116. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1964); People v.

Madden, 2 Cal. 3d 1017, 1023, 471 P.2d 971, 88 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1970).
117. Gatlin v. United States, 326 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 1049 (1965); Michenfelder v. City of Torrance, 28 Cal. App. 3d 202,
104 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1972). In addition to this, the American Bar Association
Standards for District Attorneys forbids a prosecutor from instituting criminal charges against a defendant which are not supported by probable cause.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DA 7-103 (Final Draft 1969).
An aggrieved defendant may also bring a suit against the police department for violation of his civil rights under the 1871 Civil Rights Act. See,
e.g., Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966). This suit lies in addition to the ordinary civil suit that may be instituted against the police department for false arrest.

Finally, it is relatively easy for an innocent suspect to have his arrest
record expunged. Note, The Expungement or Restriction of Arrest Records, 23 CLEv. L. REV. 495 (1972). The author surveys a variety of methods
whereby the effects of an arrest can be erased.
118. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
119. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
120. Id. at 112. The Court found a more pressing need for a hearing at
this point than before arrest because pretrial confinement could jeopardize
one's job, family life, and other relationships. See R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM
32-91 (1965). The Court added that this hearing would not be a "critical"
stage of the criminal investigation process; therefore, it would not be adversary and would not require that the defendant be represented by an attorney.
121. The main thrust of the exclusionary rule became deterrence. See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968). Similarly, Gerstein may further encourage police not to arrest without probable cause. 420 U.S. 103.
122. Both the ABA and ALI Standards encourage use of citations in lieu

The balance of interests in public arrest begins by contrasting
the rights of the individual against the interests of the state. On
the individual interests side, each person has both the right of personal mobility free from arbitrary governmental intrusion 128 and
the right to be secure from public view. The state's interests are
apprehending criminals who have the potential for escape and thoroughly investigating criminal activities.
The personal interests at stake, however, are subject to reasonable
limitations. 124 The right to personal mobility is protected against
only arbitrary and capricious police practices. The strict standard
of probable cause places a sufficient barrier between overzealous officers and the individual. 125 The accompanying expectation of secrecy is neither rational nor compelling in a public arrest. The fact
that a suspect is in an area exposed to public view radically diminishes his rightful anticipation of privacy. 2 6 Even if he subjectively
of confinement. This is applicable only to warrantless arrest situations.
ALI MODEL CODE- or PE-ARRAiGNmExT PROCEDURES § 120.2 (1975); ABA
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JusTIcE, PRETRIAL
RELEASE 2.1 (1974).

In California, an officer may release an arrestee taken without a warrant
when appropriate. CAL. PENAL CODE § 849 (West 1971) provides in pertinent part:
(b) Any peace officer may release from custody ... any person
arrested without a warrant whenever:
(1) he is satisfied that there are insufficient grounds for making a criminal complaint... ,
(2) the person arrested was arrested only for intoxication, and
no further proceedings are desirable,
(3) the person was arrested only for being under the influence
of a narcotic, drug, or restricted dangerous drug and such
person is delivered ...

to a hospital for treatment ....

123. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Commonwealth
v. Swanger, 307 A.2d 875, 878 (Pa. 1973).
124. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
125. See United States v. Watson, 44 U.S.L.W. 4112 (1976); Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 10 (1975). Reporters of the American Law Institute's Code
of Pre-ArraignmentProcedures concluded that they "could not improve on
the traditional probable cause standard." ALI MODEL CODE or PRE-AuGNMENT PROCEDURES § 120.1, Comment (1975).
126. The Court noted in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973):
[T]he constitutionally protected privacy of family, marriage, motherhood, procreation and child rearing is ... a protected intimate
relationship. [However] obviously there is no necessary or legitimate privacy which would extend to marital intercourse on a street
corner or a theatre stage. Id. at 66 n.13.
In Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), the Court elaborated on the
rationale for affording autos a lesser degree of protection and privacy:
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle. A car
has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public
thoroughfares where both its occupants and contents are in plain
view. Id. at 590.
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expects privacy, it is difficult to maintain that society should recognize that expectation because "the idea of a privacy right and a
27
place of public accommodation are mutually exclusive."',
Collateral factors weigh in favor of the state's interest. The common law recognized an officer's ability to arrest publically in nonexigent circumstances.1 28 This practice was transplanted into federal and state arrest law129 and creates precedent disfavoring a
warrant requirement. 30 The balance of interests must also take cognizance of the fact that many procedural safeguards attach to warrantless arrests.' 3 ' These safeguards sufficiently protect the limited privacy rights involved. Because of the substantial interest of
law enforcement in effective and thorough investigation, a warrant
should not be required for non-exigent public arrests.
The Balance of Interestsin Home Arrests
The right to be secure in the privacy of one's own home is basic
to the fourth amendment. 3 2 An arrest in the home restricts the
defendant's personal mobility, and it also infringes on his right privately to possess certain things and to conduct himself out of the
view of others. This intrusion into his personal effects is the consequence primarily of the plain-view' 3 3 and search incident to arrest' 34 doctrines.
The plain-view exception to the search warrant requirement permits an officer, once in the home, to view evidence of the suspected
crime' 39 as well as anything else the suspect keeps in his home. 36
127. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973).
128. See text accompanying notes 46 and 47 supra.
129. See J. LAmYNsK, supra note 43, at 45.
130. Justice Powell, concurring in Watson, stated, the "logic" of utilizing
search safeguards on arrest situations must defer to history and experience.
44 U.S.L.W. at 4117.
131. See text accompanying notes 116-122 supra.
132. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
133. The plain-view doctrine permits an officer to seize items he sees
when he is within an area where he had a right to be. United States
v. Cupp, 503 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1974). The seizure may be of weapons or
contraband, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); or of any item of
evidentiary value for the target offense or any other, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967).
134. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
135. See note 133 supra.
136. Comonwealth v. Forde, -

Mass.

._,

329 N.E.2d 717 (1975).

The chill on privacy rights' 37 inherent in the plain-view doctrine
necessitates magisterial supervision of intended invasions into the
dwelling. Like utilization of the plain-view doctrine, a search incident to arrest presents possible alarming consequences for homeowners. Incidental searches were originally permitted to safeguard
against destruction of evidence and danger to persons or property
occasioned by an arrest. 3 8 Despite the limited purpose ascribed to
incidental searches, they have been allowed outside the immediate
reach of the defendant, 139 into other rooms, 140 and into covered

boxes and closed drawers. 141 The potential for serious infringement upon a suspect's personal life by use of these types of searches
mandates exceptional protection for home arrests. Indeed, the very
act of police scanning the room is itself an infringement on fundamental rights. 142 The need for a higher degree of protection for the
dwelling place is consistent with the Supreme Court's definition of
an individual's freedom within his home:
A man may be entitled to read an obscene book in his room or
expose himself indecently there ....
We should protect his privacy. But, if he demands a right to obtain the books ... in a

public place, then to grant him his right to affect the world around
the rest of us ....

143

Courts have recognized a basic difference between the expectation of privacy in public and in the home.144 In contrast to the limited right to privacy in public places, the home stands as a private
enclave where the freedom to escape the intrusions of society is all
but absolute. 45 In his home, an individual is reasonable in anticipating full fourth amendment protection. This substantial right to
sanctity in the home must take precedent over the state's objection
137. Because officers may view items even if the defendant does not happen to be in his home at the time of the entry, see Love v. United States,
170 F.2d 32, 33 (4th Cir. 1948), many commentators believe that searches
for suspected criminals may present a convenient excuse for harassing raids
on unpopular groups and give the police a means of obtaining entry into
a building they wish to explore but for which they do not have sufficient
evidence to obtain a warrant. See Note, The Neglected Fourth Amendment

Problem in Arrest Entries,23 STAN. L. REv. 995 (1971).

138. Commonwealth v. Forde,
M
Mass. __, 329 N.E.2d 717 (1975).
139. People v. Reilley, 53 Cal. App. 3d 40, 45, 125 Cal. Rptr. 504, 508
(1975).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. In Commonwealth v. Forde, the court stated that "the crux of the
unconstitutional invasion ... lay in the roving eyes of the arresting officer
who [enters] the premises."

-

Mass. at .,

329 N.E.2d at 725.

143. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 59 (1973).
144. See Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d 456, 464 (D.D.C. Cir. 1949).
145. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 479 (1894).
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to the inconvenience of obtaining a warrant under non-exigent circumstances. Because the difference between entry to seize items
and entry to seize people is little more than conceptual, 140 the balance struck in favor of warrants for search and seizure should, as
Ramey held, attach to arrest entries:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces

of the Crown.... [T] he wind
may blow through it, but the King
47
of England may not enter.1

The fourth amendment's guaranty of privacy in the dwellingplace has been expanded by the Supreme Court to include business
offices. 148 Those portions of commercial premises which are not
open to the public149 require a slightly lesser degree of protection
than does the home,1 50 but far greater privacy than does a public
place because office personnel can "reasonably ... expect that only

...their personal or business guests would enter the office.",'8 An
arrest warrant would shield this expectation from unsupervised invasion by use of the plain-view and search incident to arrest doctrines. For this reason, warrants should be obtained also for nonexigent arrests taking place in private business offices.
CONCLUSION

As the Supreme Court in Watson points out, history, precedent,
and policy considerations underlie the lack of a warrant requirement in non-exigent public arrests. Privacy law, as well, justifies
this conclusion, for there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
public places. Finally, the fourth amendment requires simply that
an individual be free from arbitrary intrusion on his right of personal mobility. The probable cause standard satisfies this requirement. However, the expectation of privacy is much stronger and
more vital in the home.
It is difficult to reconcile the judiciary's reverence for the home
in the context of a search with the attitude of most courts when
146. See Commonwealth v.Forde,

(1975).

147. Quoted in F. COOLEY, A

-

Mass.

-,

329 N.E.2d 717, 722

TREATIsE ON CONSruTioNAL LIMITATIONS

611.
148. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 367 (1968).
149. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 551 (1967).

150. In See, the Court maintained that business premises may be searched
more often than homes because of the needs of the state to regulate business. Id. at 546.
151. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968).

the home is similarly invaded for an arrest. Notwithstanding the
often cavalier treatment accorded warrantless home arrests, Justice
Marshall's warning in Watson should be heeded: "No one acquires
a vested or protected right in violation of the Consitution by long
use even if the space of time covers our entire national existence."'152 The decision of the California Supreme Court in Ramey
represents an enlightened approach to warrantless, non-emergency
entries into the home: More jurisdictions should adopt this view.

NANcY L. ScHoNs

152. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4117 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

